Abstract-To protect active traffic against link or node failures in multi-hop communications networks, several so-called protection schemes have been introduced in the past. The most established ones are path, segment, node and link protection. However, these schemes are limited as challenges are modelled abstractly. Challenges in real networks can have very different characteristics how they impact the network, e.g., unusual high load can temporarily overload the network in a particular area, whereas a heavy rain thunderstorm cell affects all wireless links while moving across the network area, and last attacks exploiting software bugs affect systems spread all over the network. Thus, we propose to explicitly take the high impact challenges of the deployment into account as they are perceived by a risk assessment procedure. We do this by introducing a risk-group concept into the multi-path placement scheme, which provides an evaluation of the likelihood of a challenge to simultaneously affect two links or two nodes respectively. The calculation of risk groups is an offline process done during network planning and thus not impacting the multi-path placement time. We have implemented and evaluated this new methodology in simulations and show that it outperforms the original scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the face of exploding user traffic in cellular networks, increasing the spectral efficiency to achieve higher access capacities is widely considered to be only possible via SDMA (space division multiple access). To this end, very large numbers of small cell base stations will be brought up in the near future. As an example, Picochip, a femtocell maker, claims that London needs to install 70,000 femtocells by 2015 to provide decent 4G LTE mobile services [1] . Since wired backhaul will not be generally available for all small cells, wireless backhaul networks will gain importance. An example network layout is depicted in Figure 1 . Small cells provide access to the users via their LTE interface and use point to multi-point or point to point links (e.g. in the millimeter wave spectrum) for backhauling building a mesh network for redundancy reasons. Uplink data is forwarded to the wireless aggregation network consisting of relay nodes which do not provide access to users. Finally, the data gets forwarded to the wired part of the aggregation network (often called metro network) which is connected to the mobile operator's core network. In areas where huge numbers of users are expected, e.g., train stations, or an Olympic stadium, the small cell density can be very high.
A drawback of a wireless backhaul network is the instability of its links. Even highly directed microwave links such as used for carrier-grade mobile backhaul networks are affected by bad weather conditions and link quality may degrade or a link might fail completely [2] . To avoid re-routing latency, a common approach is to proactively establish backup routes which are used in case the primary route fails. In the routing community, this is called multi-path routing, in the telecom world, this is known as protection.
Given a source node, a destination node and a primary path between them, protection can happen at multiple levels of granularity. Figure 2 shows different widely established protection schemes. Clearly, more fine-grained protection comes at the expense of more signalling messages. On the other hand, the problem of less connectivity between primary and backup path is that, in cases of failures, it might be difficult to salvage so-called in-flight packets, i.e. packets which are already on their way when a failure occurs. This leads to larger gaps (i.e. consecutively lost packets), which is particularly detrimental to voice traffic where clipping is audible already with two or three lost packets in a row.
Rope-ladder protection (RLP) as introduced in [3] (cf. also Figure 2e )) combines the advantages of path, node and link protection by constructing two node-disjoint paths between s and d (the "ropes") and connecting each node on the primary path with a node on the backup path via so-called "rungs". As shown in [3] , this increases path diversity and path lifetime while reducing loss gaps. However, [3] focused on ropeladders, where primary and backup path are placed close to each other to minimize the switch-over delay. Moreover, it assumed that each node of the primary node is connected to the backup path by a rung. In this paper, we will focus on this first requirement and the impact the limited freedom of path placement has on the resilience of the resulting protection structure.
One of the major novelties of this paper over [3] is that it introduces the notion of challenges and thus challengeawareness. A challenge to a wireless backhaul communication network could be a thunderstorm, a congestion hotspot or a virus attack, for example. Many protection schemes are either completely challenge-unaware or designed to meet only one particular challenge. In this paper, a path construction algorithm is proposed that can optimize the protection structure with respect to the high-impact challenges [4] . We consider a challenge to be of high impact if the challenge impact on the protected assets is high, i.e., the probability of the challenge occurring and the imposed loss is high. Such a risk assessment must be performed by experts of the network operator and are deployment and business specific. Based on this assessment, we apply the Shared-Risk Link Group concept known from the optical networks space [5] to the used protection scheme. A special entity of the network management system translates a challenge into a so-called risk group. Based on this, it steers the rope-ladder construction process such as to be maximally robust towards the high impact challenges. Our simulation clearly show that a focus on a small challenge set is necessary for high resilience as with every additional challenge considered the resilience degrades in some cases even worse than the challenge agnostic scheme.
The mentioned special entity is the Graph Explorer, introduced in [6] . The Graph Explorer (GE) is a general tool that can explore a large set of properties in multi-hop networks. One example would be to determine a "link criticality" value for each link in the network, i.e., the severity of the impact which the failure of a link has on the rest of the network in terms of traffic load distribution, jitter, etc. For the sake of this paper, we will use the capabilities of GE to compute the impact of challenges on the network and to steer the ropeladder construction process accordingly. This will be described in detail in Section III. This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses previous research in the domain of multipath QoS routing or protection and its relation to our proposition. Section III introduces the rope-ladder construction with the help of GE. Section IV presents our performance evaluation. Section V gives a short summary.
II. RELATED WORK
As mentioned previously, work in the context of our paper is discussed as multi-path routing as well as protection schemes.
There is quite a number of works in the domain of multipath routing protocols. An overview of this diverse field can be found in [7] . Different multi-path routing protocols focus on a number of aspects like load balancing, bandwidth bundling, security, congestion control or even security (sending packets of a sensitive flow via different paths to make eavesdropping more difficult). One goal is obviously resilience to failures.
Multi-path protocols can be divided into proactive, reactive or hybrid protocols. In proactive strategies, topological information needed for route discovery is exchanged regardless of whether or not it is needed at the moment, in reactive strategies, routes are only discovered on demand. Proactive protocols have the advantage that alternate paths are already available when needed, while reactive protocols must discover them first. On the other hand, proactive protocols typically require more messages in scenarios with mobility and moderate traffic, since in these cases a lot of information is propagated prophylactically even if never used at all. There are hybrid strategies which use a proactive protocol within a limited zone (e.g. in a cluster) and a reactive protocol for larger distances.
Most works on multi-path routing try to establish paths in a decentralized way. In this paper, however, we will present a rope-ladder construction process which assumes a centralized entity with global topological knowledge (which hosts the GE). While this might be unrealistic for MANETS or sensor networks, it is realistic for operator-owned networks like metro-or backhaul networks.
A further classification refers to the independence of the individual paths of the multipath. To increase security or robustness, the paths should be as independent as possible which gives rise to node-disjoint or link-disjoint multipaths. Some protocols do not make any statement or assumption about the path independence. Another criterion of multipath routing protocols is the path count, i.e. the number of alternate paths. In some protocols, this is fixed [8] , in others, the number can be parametrized [9] .
Among the most well-known multi-path protocols are ad hoc on-demand distance vector multipath (AODVM) [10] or split multipath routing (SMR) [8] , two path protection schemes. Segment and node protection schemes are sometimes referred to as braided multi-path. A known scheme is proposed in [11] . The advantages of rope-ladder protection over these schemes have been shown in [3] .
In the telecom world, particularly in the area of optical networks, related work is known as protection schemes. Terms like path, node or link protection are commonly used in traffic engineering technologies such as MPLS and do not need further discussion here. Interesting to mention, however, is that the optical networks community has introduced a concept called shared-risk link group (SRLG) [5] . A SRLG contains all links in a network that are susceptible to the same risk. The typical use case would be two optical fibers which share a common duct. If the duct is destroyed, likely not only one but both fibers share its fate, leading to disruption of traffic through both fibers. The concept of SRLG is very generic, allowing to capture arbitrary risks. Similarly, shared-risk node groups capture risks impacting one or multiple nodes. In [12] , SRLG and SRNG are combined into shared-risk resource groups.
Probably most of the SRLG related propositions occupy themselves with finding SRLG (SRNG/SRRG) diverse paths (path protection). However, they do not compare different protection schemes. In this paper, we will compare path and rope-ladder protection in the face of SRLGs.
III. CONSTRUCTING CHALLENGE-AWARE PROTECTION SCHEMES
In this section, we describe how risk-aware protection schemes between a source and a destination node are constructed. First, we will introduce risk group models of three different challenges. Then we describe protection construction process based on the challenges which are to be considered.
A. Challenge Model and Risk Groups
A challenge is an event which occurs in the network and which threatens the network's normal operation. Examples for such challenges in wireless networks include for example adverse weather conditions, virus attacks, failures of software components, equipment theft or network overload. An exhaustive classification of challenges can be found in [13] . The network is defined by its interconnection pattern, i.e. network topology, which can be represented as a graph consisting of sets of nodes N and links L.
As indicated previously, the optical networks domain has introduced the idea of shared-risk link groups (SRLG). Here, we apply this concept to multi-path protection. A challenge C is modelled in terms of such a risk group as a set of network elements failing simultaneously. The risk group of a challenge C, denoted as RG C , is defined in terms of the logical vicinity of the protected elements (i.e. nodes and links): given that node n 1 is in risk group RG C , node n 2 is also in RG C if its logical vicinity to n 1 -denoted v(RG C , n 1 , n 2 ) -is above a certain threshold τ . Formally,
and similarly
for the links. The impact of all challenges has been modelled with a step function (corresponds with setting τ = 0) in our simulations. In other words, any link or node affected by the challenge C fails reducing its bandwidth to zero hence RG C = C. The impact function τ can easily be extended to complex and realistic scenarios.
The logical vicinity function v(RG C , n i , n j ) of all considered challenges needs to be defined manually by a network expert and can span one or more arbitrary dimensions. For instance, in areal challenges (e.g. a storm cell) the logical vicinity of two elements correlates with the geographical vicinity of the elements, whereas logical vicinity of a challenge exploiting a software bug correlates with the vendor ID. In this paper, we have modelled three different classes of challenges: (i) a flash crowd event at a congestion hotspot, (ii) a heavy rain cell, and (iii) a virus targeting a firmware bug.
Congestion hotspot. A single congestion hotspot is defined by a static area, e.g., a train station or a stadium, where huge numbers of users can cause overload situations. All received connection requests are legitimate but cannot be satisfied by the system simultaneously; such events are called flash crowd events in contrast to denial of service attacks which are of malicious nature. The logical vicinity function is defined by the area the C affected nodes are located at:
Thunderstorm cell. A different type of areal disruption is a thunderstorm cell moving randomly across the graph, producing a large set of independent thunderstorm challenges C = {C 1 , C 2 ...C k }. The logical vicinity function of a single thunderstorm challenge C i (for i k) provides that links l 1 and l 2 appear within the same risk group if the rain cell area with a radius r(C i ) and an given epicentre e(C i ) overlaps both links. Formally,
where d(a, b) is the distance function between points a and b. We consider this a reasonable first order approach, since environmental studies model storms as concentric ellipses [2] . Often, logical vicinity will be related to geographic positioning (e.g. distance to the epicentre) but other environmental characteristics may define this function, too.
Firmware vulnerability. The last attack we considered is a generic virus attacking one firmware vulnerability of exposed graph elements, producing a set of firmware challenges C. If a single firmware challenge C i is launched against the mesh network, all nodes using the targeted firmware version i are threatened and hence share the same risk group. Formally,
where f irmware(e) is the firmware type on a mesh element vulnerable to a predefined virus type. Without loss of generality, we applied step functions to model firmware impacts, such that every node featuring f irmware(e) will have their forwarding capacity reduced to zero.
Before going into the details, consider some principal advantages of challenge aware protection schemes over challenge agnostic protection schemes. If the challenge would be, for example, a thunderstorm cell, then a multi-path protection scheme could be optimized by providing two paths which are separated by more than the diameter of the expected thunderstorm cell, which means that the latter would normally not affect both paths at the same time.
B. The Construction Process
In order to construct challenge-aware rope-ladders, we have combined the RLP scheme with the Graph Explorer as introduced in [6] . The Graph Explorer is a tool to assess various metrics of a network in the face of an arbitrary number of challenges occurring simultaneously in this network. We use this tool to calculate the risk groups before starting to place the rope-ladder structure. The required calculation can already be done during the network planning phase and the results stored for the actual placing of the protection structure. In Section IV we will compare the original protection scheme with an improved, now challenge-aware protection scheme for two different types, namely path protection (PP) and ropeladder protection (RLP). The construction of a rope-ladder is divided in three sequential steps as follows.
Step A: Placement of the Primary path. As the risk groups depend on the links and nodes of the primary path, the choice of the primary path is a crucial one in our process. An intuitive approach would choose the primary path to be the shortest path from source to destination. However this can lead to fragile backup paths crossing high risk elements, as illustrated in Figure 3 .
Thus, we propose that the process should iterate over all paths up to a maximum stretch with respect to the shortest path, providing a set of P paths. Eventually, the primary path which leads to the less risky backup path will be selected as the primary path for the connection (as we will describe in the last step).
Step B: Calculation of Link Weights. The input to this step are all the primary paths P provided by step A, and the high-impact set of challenges C from which the network should be protected. Depending on the vicinity function v, additional information must be made available such as firmware ID, the frequency allocation plan, etc. Multiple risk groups can be added into a unified risk group (URG) by merging the link weights of different challenge types. This merging function must be determined during the network manager's risk assessment process, and it should account for the respective occurrence probability of the different challenges types. In our simulations we assumed that all challenge types are both independent and equally probable. Hence all weights belonging to the same challenge type were further normalized to sum the complete probability.
The output of step B are multiple weight clouds W, i.e. sets of node and link weights representing the risk group memberships with respect to each primary path. This weight cloud calculation process is described in Algorithm 1. In words, the weight of element y will increment for every time that y shared a challenge in C with any of the elements in P . An intuitive visual representation of each primary path's risk group is the union of all the challenge instances C (e.g. thunderstorms in this example) that intersect with the primary path by at least one link or node. The storm's link weights 3 . Example of how the selection of a primary path affects a thunderstorm cell risk groups (this image is best viewed in colour). The black coloured link framed by a red double line represents the selected primary path; all other links are colour coded illustrating the respective link weights: the more red a link is coloured the higher is the link weight or in other words the higher is the probability of this link failing simultaneously with a primary path's link. The risk associated with the shortest path can be illustrated as the cloud shown in Figure 4 . In example a) any backup path is bound to cross medium to high risk links. In example b) the potential risk is lowered by rerouting the primary path through the rightmost links.
associated with the shortest path can be illustrated as the cloud shown in Figure 4 .
Step C: Placement of the Backup Structure. A set of backup paths B is found by iterating over all URG pairs {P, W } offered by step B. A shortest path algorithm determines the backup path with the least weight which does not exceed an arbitrary stretch limit. The basic idea of our approach is that the backup path circumvents the cloud in Figure 4 and stays out of it for as long as possible, hence minimizing the link weights that will be crossed. An enhancement to this step currently under investigation as part of our ongoing research is the use of a risk threshold heuristic which is acceptable for the backup path. The process would only iterate over the Algorithm 1: Compute a primary path's weight cloud.
Data: Primary path P Data: Set of challenges
shortest paths until a backup path is found with acceptable risk, improving the overall time performance. Finally, once all {P, W } pairs have been processed, the backup path with the lowest weight in B is selected to form the rope-ladder; the rungs are determined afterwards (the rungs are cross-connects from the primary path to the backup path to minimize the loss gap for real time application flows -see [3] for details).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section describes the simulation scenario built to evaluate the performance of challenge-aware RLP as introduced in Section III, followed by a qualitative analysis of the simulation results.
A. Scenario description
Our simulation scenario consists of the wireless backhaul network topology G B introduced in Section I. We modelled the wireless part of the network between Access Points as a meshed lattice with 61 Access Point nodes, 3 Relay nodes, and 197 links as depicted in Figure 4 . We chose a meshed lattice as a testbed because it allows an easy construction of rope ladders even when multiple links are under the effects of a challenge. This enables us to progressively measure the effect of evolving challenges while being certain that backup paths will exist for most node pairs.
The three challenges proposed in the previous section are configured as follows. For the thunderstorm cell challenge, the storm has a radius in the range [50, 120] m. Its epicenter was shifted in steps of 14 m, providing a total of 5, 000 storm instances. For the firmware virus challenge we assumed that each link uses one firmware version, and randomly scattered 4 different firmwares among all 197 links. Finally the hotspot challenge expands the size of an arbitrary train station 150x150m in a static area next to a Relay, as roughly illustrated by a shaded ellipse in Figure 1 .
The selected application is a unicast VoIP application. A source node communicates with a destination node by generating an uninterrupted unicast stream of 64 kbps CBR with 160 bytes data frames, which simulates a G.711 VoIP codec. All the links in the graph have a capacity of 1 Mbps duplex connections with 10 ms delay. For each non adjacent AccessPoint-Relay pair in G B a RLP scheme was constructed as described in the previous section, consisting of a primary path, a backup path and the respective rungs. The structure is built via the Graph Explorer such that the backup path is maximally disjoint from the primary path's risk group, while favoring the shortest distance between source and destination. Figure 4 illustrates this process for a single source-destination pair by assigning a colour to each link in the graph.
To simulate the effect of a challenge on a voice stream, a voice call is held between two random nodes for an arbitrary time span of 3 minutes. This data flow is established via a primary path following a RLP scheme. One minute into the call, an instance of a challenge occurs; if the challenge is an instance of a storm cell risk group, the affected links represent backup path high risk link medium risk link low risk link rung primary path Fig. 4 . A challenge-aware RLP scheme for one random Access Point and a Relay node on the G B topology. The effect of the thunderstorm is displayed as a shadow covering the susceptible links, subject to the condition that the storm hitting the primary path. The darker the shadow, the higher the likelihood for a link to fail together with the primary path. A dotted green coloured link represents the absence of such a link in any of the primary path links' risk group. Conversely, a red coloured line represents a link which shares risk groups with multiple links of the primary path and has a high likelihood of failing when a link of the primary path is affected. Intuitively, the backup path should cross as little red links as possible. The randomly isolated high-risk links are those affected by the firmware risk group. the area of the storm; for an instance of a firmware virus attack risk group, the affected links are sharing the same firmware. In both cases, the bandwidth of the affected links is reduced to zero for the duration of the challenge, virtually disconnecting them. As soon as the links become unavailable, the central routing protocol will divert in-flight packets and adapt routing tables to the RLP scheme backup path through the rung which is closest to the challenge. The challenge remains in place for one minute, after which all the links in the network are restored to their initial state, and the data stream is reverted to its default primary route for the remaining minute. We repeated this setup for the three considered challenge types.
B. Simulation results
The main outcome of the simulations is illustrated in Figures 5-7 and can be interpreted as follows.
First, we measured the packet loss that different protection schemes suffered by a storm cell occurring. The percentage of packets lost by an oblivious RLP scheme (i.e. a rope ladder uninformed about possible challenges during construction) is 10.3%, approximately two times the percentage of packets lost by the RG Storm aware RLP scheme, which lost 4.8% of packets as shown in the leftmost chart of Figure 5 . Similarly, for PP schemes the inclusion of the risk groups also reduced the percentage of lost packets. These numbers illustrate a significant performance increase with respect to the experienced packet loss at a cost of no additional resources, since the length of the primary path remains almost constant.
Secondly we evaluate the gap size, measured as the the maximum difference in sequence numbers between two con- Percentage of packets lost of protection schemes. The three sets of charts display the packet loss effects of Storm, F irmware, and Hostspot challenges on G B . Each set displays seven bars, corresponding to the protection schemes: oblivious P P , oblivious RLP , RG Storm -aware, RG F irmware -aware, RG Hotspot -aware, and U RG 2 -aware and U RG 3 -aware. . Average gap size of protection schemes. The three sets of charts display the gap size effects of Storm, F irmware, and Hostspot challenges on G B . Each set displays seven bars, corresponding to the protection schemes: oblivious P P , oblivious RLP , RG Storm -aware, RG F irmwareaware, RG Hotspot -aware, and U RG 2 -aware and U RG 3 -aware.
secutive received frames. Given that the routing is controlled by a central authority, the delay induced by a challenge message propagation is dismissed, i.e., the routing tables are instantly updated across the network. This effect works in favour of PP schemes, by ignoring the propagation delay involved in route table synchronization. Nevertheless the flows' gap size effect of rerouted in-flight packets is still noticeable. For example, suppose that the last link in the primary path fails. The PP scheme virtually loses all in-flight packets along the main path, because they are to be routed all the way back to the source, causing them to arrive to destination with an expired sequence number. Gap-sensitive applications such as voice traffic will suffer clipping when exposed to this sort of gap losses. RLP schemes avoid the generation of gaps by instantly re-routing in-flight packets to the backup path via the closest rung, avoiding packet delays. All three simulation scenarios displayed in Figure 6 illustrate RLP challenge aware schemes suffering smaller gap sizes than PP oblivious schemes. In order to test the behaviour of RLP schemes subject to challenges not included in the planned risk group RG C we also measured the performance of a challenge aware RLP scheme against unexpected sets of challenges. The blue striped bars in Figure 6 illustrate this effect: challenge aware RLP schemes'performance degrades under the attack of unexpected challenges. The performance of schemes under unexpected attacks may even degrade beyond their oblivious counterparts. Such is the case for RLR RG Storm schemes under Firmware challenges, which lost 4.4% of the voice packets, as opposed to only 4.0% for the oblivious scheme.
This adverse effect motivates us to study multi-challenge aware protection schemes through the use of URG. Ideally a multi-challenge aware rope ladder structure can withstand different non-simultaneous challenge attacks without a significant drop in performance. First we define U RG 2 as the unified risk group formed by adding the two risk groups with the highest impact out of the storm cell, firmware virus and hotspot. Additionally we define U RG 3 as the risk group resulting from the addition of all three risk groups. Weights are consequently normalized, as specified in section III.
Simulations show that the percentage of packets lost by U RG 2 and U RG 3 schemes under a storm cell challenge are 5.4% and 5.2% respectively (as illustrated Figure 5 ), representing a significant improvement over the oblivious RLP scheme (10.3%), yet not performing as good as a RG Storm aware scheme (4.8%). Overall, in terms of packet loss all URG protection schemes' outperform both their oblivious and challenge-aware schemes under the effects of unexpected challenges.
On the other hand Figure 6 illustrates URG schemes suffering large gap sizes. The protection scheme with the lowest gap size is the one tailored to the challenge, i.e. RG Hotspot with a gap of 1.6 packets, however the gap sizes of U RG 2 and U RG 3 schemes under flash crowd challenges are 8.6 packets and 3.9 packets respectively, whereas the oblivious RLP scheme only lost 8.3 packets. In conclusion, URG schemes' gap sizes are highly dependant on the type of challenge and considered risk groups.
In addition to the packet loss ratio and gap size metrics, we also counted the number of cases where a scheme's source and destination nodes became disconnected, i.e. cases where the challenge split the protection scheme in two disconnected components. In the event that a RLP or PP scheme becomes disconnected the voice call is interrupted, due to the data flow not being able to reach its destination. This effect contributes to the increase of packet loss for the duration of the challenge, as we currently do not consider creation of a new multipath (RLP or PP) once a voice call was interrupted. Figure 7 displays the percentage of schemes maintaining the connectivity between source and destination nodes, for different storm sizes. The challenge occurring during each simulation run had Percentage of schemes that did not lose connectivity between source-destination nodes, after all instances of the Storm challenge did respectively hit the network. Oblivious schemes are represented with dashed lines, challenge-aware schemes are represented with solid lines.
exactly the radius which was assumed during risk assessment and thus the protection scheme was optimized for. For the network under study, schemes constructed with risk group information are more resilient to disconnection than oblivious schemes, as reflected in Figure 7 . In addition the percentage of surviving protection schemes decreases with the size of the thunderstorm cell.
To summarize, challenge aware RLP and PP schemes outperform their oblivious counterparts when faced to an expected sets of challenges. However these optimizations can lead to performance degradations in face of unexpected challenges. Overall all presented protection schemes performed surprisingly well due to the regular structure of a full meshed lattice graph, which offers high path diversity even under the effect of geographical challenges.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented an algorithm to improve the placement of rope-ladder protection schemes in multihop wireless networks. The algorithm is based on the Graph Explorer, a general tool to explore properties and metrics in arbitrary graphs. During the network planing phase, we have employed a unified risk group approach which makes use of a logical vicinity function that relates each link and node in the network to individual risk groups. During network operation the Graph Explorer assesses possible placements of rope-ladders such as to be maximally robust towards certain challenges. Using simulations, we have evaluated this challenge aware rope-ladder scheme with the original rope-ladder scheme and with path protection. The packet loss rate was reduced by up to 80.4% compared to the oblivious scheme, but more remarkably the number of protection schemes surviving the challenge onset was increased by up to 25%.
While many challenges and thus risk groups have been modelled, two important factors remain as future work. First, there will always be unforeseen challenges which were not taken into account while establishing the protection. We showed that facing the rope-ladder scheme to unexpected challenges can lead to a decrease in performance, which can be softened by the addition of unified risk groups. Second, multiple challenges may occur at the same time or at least overlap, so that (protected) paths are affected by a number of simultaneous challenges, rather than a single challenge at a time. This means that robustness of protection schemes must actually also be tested with respect to unforeseen challenges as well as an overlay of risk groups stemming from different challenges which may happen simultaneously. The focus on the high impact challenges during the network design stage is critical.
